A Report on Soviet tactics, by James Sterrett

Intro

 The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the major alternative to the Western approach to tactics.  As numerous large books have been written on this topic, the chapter must of necessity have what Dr. Arthur Waldron calls the "courage of superficiality" in numerous places.  Those seeking greater depth are directed to the sources listed at the end of each section.  I have chosen to present the Soviet approach to tactics as it is meant to be used.  There are many wrangles that can be had in arguing over how well it was actually implemented.

 In this chapter, the term "Soviet" is used because for many years it indeed was the Soviet approach; and because, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, "Soviet" a far more convenient tag than "Soviet/Former Soviet State/Former Soviet Client State/Current Client of Former Soviet State".

Mirror-Imaging: A Warning

 In thinking about the Soviet way of war, it is important for the Western reader to avoid mirror-imaging.  Mirror-imaging takes two primary forms:

 - shoehorning unfamiliar Soviet concepts into familiar Western ones: this commonly occurs when Soviet terms appear to approximate Western ones - sometimes they actually are similar, and sometimes they are not.

 - dismissing the unfamiliar as stupid: Soviet concepts can be seen as quite silly when misread or ripped out of the context of the rest of the Soviet approach to war.  In order to assist in avoiding this, some notes have been provided as to the Soviet understanding of the meaning of some terms.

 Much of the Western stereotype of the Soviet way of war comes from a combination of these two forms of mirror-imaging.

Part I: The Structure of The Soviet Approach to War: Definitions

 The Soviets approach warfare in a way that seems terribly structured to the Western eye.  Everything is divided up and given a definition.  While this appears rigid, the reality is much the reverse.  By giving everyone a set of base definitions, communications, especially on theory, are simplified; when discussing "the tactics of the Forward Detachment" there's no uncertainty about - and hence need to define - what tactics are, or what the Forward Detachment is.  The structure of definitions also serves to help highlight problems by assisting in their definition - recall S. L. A. Marshall's comment that a problem "must be circumscribed before there is belief in its existence."   Finally, the structure itself is subject to change, and the Soviet military press is periodically filled with debates on changing various definitions.

 The main definitions the Soviets draw (of importance here) follow; the key elements of an official Soviet definition is quoted, followed by a brief explanation where necessary.

Doctrine: "the official, systematic, government view of the nature, goals, and character of possible future wars, on the preparation of the nation and armed forces for them, and on the means of waging them."

 Doctrine in the Soviet understanding is very high-level: it is what the politicians think is the mission and method of conduct of war for the military.  "No First Use" of nuclear weapons is a simple example of a military doctrine: the politicians telling the soldiers that they may not consider a specific option.  Note that phrases such as "Tactical Doctrine" are oxymoronic in Soviet terms.

Military Science: "A system of knowledge about the laws and military-strategic character of war, the construction and preparation of military forces for war and means of conducting armed combat."

 This is is the study of all things pertaining to the preparation and application of military force.  In contrast to doctrine, these areas *are* subject to (often intense) debate.  The aspect of interest here is Military Art.  Note that in Russian, the term "science" is much more widely applied than in English; it essentially means any field of systematic enquiry.

Military Art: "the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting combat actions on the land, sea, and in the air."

 This is the business of fighting in a broad sense.  It encompasses Strategy, Operational Art, and Tactics and covers their intersections.  Note that the Russian "iskusstvo", while commonly (and here) translated as "art", it could as well be translated as "craft"; it is the "art" in "artisan" - one who performs work requiring both basic, learned skills, and also a certain flair.  A good carpenter has not only mastered the use of the tools (learned skills), but also has a talent for using them to best effect (partly innnate artistic ability, partly learned through experience.)

Strategy: "is the highest part of Military Science, turning theory into practice.  It deals with the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war, and the planning and conduct of war as a whole.  Military Strategy is closely tied to the Doctrine of the government; it solves concrete problems within the framework set out in Doctrine."

Operational Art: "the aspect of Military Art encompassing the theory and practice of the preparation and employment of combined-arms formations, including operations or combat actions combining various types of military forces."

 Operational Art is one of the cornerstones of the Soviet understanding and conduct of war.  It is the business of successfully combining the combat activities of a large number of forces over a significant area of space and time in order to accomplish all or part of a strategic goal .  It thus occupies a middle ground between tactics and strategy - between battle-fighting and war planning; it is where the goals of strategy are turned into missions for tactics, and the possibilities of tactics are correlated with the needs of strategy.  As stated by Aleksandr Svechin, 'All the levels of war are closely interrelated: tactics makes the steps of which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path.'   Tactics is battle-fighting; Operational Art is choosing, ordering, and arranging the battles to achieve a strategic goal.

 The Soviets have long studied this level of war (the term Operational Art was coined by Aleksandr Svechin in the mid-1920s, on the basis of Moltke's term "operativ" ("operation") for describing a campaign).  The primary impact it has on tactics is this: every battle is being fought for a reason, and there is a good reason that it is being fought the way it is being fought.

 Operational art, and the wider view it promotes, has not always been well understood in the West (its existence was denied until the mid-1970s).  One of the better examples of the this Western blindness, and of the difference between Operational Art and Tactics, is provided by the blindness evident in von Mellenthin's book Panzer Battles and its famed descriptions of the 48th Panzer Corps's defense of the Chir River line against the Soviet 5th Tank Army.  48th Panzer's tactical successes against the half-strength 5th Tank Army are well-described in the book.  What is not explained is of greater importance.  48th Panzer's tactical successes must be seen against 5th Tank Army's mission: pinning 48th Panzer Corps so that it could not interefere with the Middle Don Operation.  That operation was a success, with operational results: 49 Axis divisions wiped out, the the Italian 8th Army and Army Detachment Hollidt shattered, and the Axis driven from the middle Don, in significant part because 48th Panzer Corps was very successfully fighting the wrong battle.   Again: Tactics is battle-fighting; Operational Art is arranging the battles to achieve a strategic goal.

 The Soviets consider that in general, operational art encompasses the activity of Corps/Army size formations through a Theater of Operations (Soviet acronym: TVD, 'Teatr voennykh deistvii'.)

Tactics: "is the theory and practice of the preparation and combat employment of subunits, units, and formations."

 Tactics are conducted by units of divisional size and smaller.  As the bulk of this chapter is devoted to exploring tactics, further detail here is limited to defining a few more terms:

 Subunit: ("podrazdelenie") A small unit composed of only one arm of service - typically a Battalion or smaller.

 Unit: ("chast") A small combined arms force.  A Regiment is typically the smallest "Unit", precisely because it has been the smallest force to combine tanks, infantry, and artillery in one force.  A unit's TOE is typically set, though it might be altered by attachments or withdrawals.  (In some newer structures under consideration a Battalion becomes a combined-arms force and thus a Unit in a Battalion-Brigade-Corps structure.)

 Formation: ("soedinenie") A combined-arms force composed of several Units.  Typically a Division, Brigade, or larger.

Further Reading for Part I:

 The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art: The Documentary Basis, James Schnieder's The Structure of Strategic Revolution, especially chapter 1; and Shimon Naveh's In Pursuit of Military Excellence, Svechin, Triandafillov
 

Part II: Some History

 The Imperial Russian Army was forced to confront the realities of modern warfare in 1904 during its clash with Japan over Manchuria.  The series of defeats it suffered caused renewed investigation into modern tactics, a process furthered by the onset of World War I.  While they launched one of the most successful offensives of World War I (Brusilov's 1916 offensive on the South-Western Front made siginificant gains and largely shattered the Austro-Hungarian Army), Russia's overall performance in the war was below par, and this directly contributed to the eventual ousting of the monarchy in March 1917 [February under the old calendar, which the Bolsheviks replaced at the beginning of 1918.]  The Provisional Government was no more competent in its presecution of the war, which assisted in creating the conditions for the Bolshevik uprising in November [October under the old calendar.]  That uprising plunged Russia into a civil war.  In 1921 the Bolsheviks finished defeating monarchists, military dictators, Western intervention forces, and most of a variety of guerilla movements (some in Central Asia sputtered on for the next decade.)

 Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, the officers who survived all of this fighting produced the concepts of Deep Battle, and Successive Deep Operations as means of dealing with the problems of modern warfare by engaging the enemy with fire throughout the depths of his defense to suppress, disrupt and dislocate, while using an echeloned attack structure to make a breakthrough and then insert mechanized exploitation forces into the breach.  These were to drive deep, encircling the enemy and seizing a line which would form the jumping-off point for the next operation.  They formed the first airborne units and massed armored formations, and tested them in maneuvers.  Unfortunately, many of the best and brightest of these people were then shot in the later 1930s.  A good showing against the Japanese at Khalkin-Gol in 1939 was offset by an initially dismal performance against the Finns in the winter of 1939-1940.

 Nonetheless, the Soviets had already formed one of their hallmarks: their economy was already functioning on a near-war-footing.  One of the major foci of the 5-Year Plans of the 1930s was military production.  The military insisted that a state of 'permanent mobilization' was necessary in order to be prepared for the wars they belived were inevitable.  Production increasingly tended (though the goal was not always reached) towards weapons that were advanced, yet simple and robust in construction.  The T-34 is a good example of this: an advanced design lead to a previously unseen of combination of heavy firepower, high mobility, and heavy armor, in a tank designed from the ground up to be easily mass-produced, easy to service, and hard to break.

 Nonetheless, the Soviets appear to have been caught napping when engulfed by Barbarossa.  Tactical surprise quickly escalated into operational defeats, with the Soviet first echelon forces in the north and center largely destroyed in the opening months.  Nonetheless, they soon began to regain their feet, delivering, even in 1941, the stiffest resistance the Germans had ever met, and through dogged resistance turned operational and tactical disaster into strategic victory by ensuring, at Moscow, that the war would continue.  This meant the long-term Soviet advantages in economics would be able to counter-act short-term (and steadily diminishing) German advantages in military skill.  When, in 1945, the Soviets raised the Red flag over the Reichstag, it was symbolic of their victory in the largest war in human history.  They won it through a combination of bitter fighting, superior equipment provided in large numbers, and eventual mastery of operational art and tactics.  In 1941, the German Army was the best in the world.  In 1945 that title probably belongs to the Soviets.

 The cost of that victory was phenomenal.  The combination of 4 years of intense combat with Germany's genocidal occupation policies killed at least 28 million Soviets - over 10 a minute - and left much of the European part of the Soviet Union in ruins.  This cataclysm seared itself deeply into the Soviet mindset: May 9th (the anniversary of the German official surrender to the Soviets, a day later than that to the West) was the one official Soviet holiday to get heartfelt mass participation.

 One of the legacies of the war on the Soviet attitude to war is that their preparations have been, ever since, for a total, all-out war such as World War II.  They assume that such a war will involve massive casulaties on both sides in a fight to the death between alliance systems.  Peacekeeping operations are a very new idea for them, and guerilla warfare only began to get attention in Afghanistan.

 This memory had its cost.  The Soviets were grimly aware of their close shave with defeat in 1941, and the military continued to insist on high levels of production to ensure that it was always massive and well-equipped enough to prevent a repeat of WWII.  This resulted in a huge imbalance in the economy, with consumer production repeatedly suffering in favor of military output.  Combined with the inefficiencies of a command economy, this was a recipe for long-term disaster.  Khrushchev made an attempt to make the system sustainable in the long term, moving production towards civilian ends and reducing the military budget by placing more reliance on nuclear forces (as cheaper than conventional), but he was overturned by the old guard & the military.  By the 1980s, the economic collapse had gone too far to be reversed without massive changes in the system.  Gorbachev's reforms were too little, too late.  [The Soviet standard of living dropped visibly during my 10-month stay in the USSR in 1989-1990.]  Nonetheless, Gorbachev's reforms were too much for the conservatives to stomach - but when they tried to turn the clock back in 1991, popular opposition put a stop to them, and the Soviet Union disintegrated.

 Soviet strategy immediately after WWII pretended to ignore nuclear weapons.  Stalin said they were not a big deal, partly because the Soviets didn't have any for a few years, and partly because nobody had many during his lifetime.  Khrushchev's attempt to get cheap defence from nuclear missiles and bluff lead to both a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons for political reasons.  This held until the late 1960s, when the growing numbers of nuclear weapons made it increasingly clear that this was not going to be a viable way to fight.  Over the next ten years the Soviets evolved to a nuclear-scared posture, in which they expected the war to begin conventionally, but eventually to go nuclear.  They expected NATO to initiate nuclear warfare, but also hoped to detect the preparations for such and get in the first shot.  (Note that they considered this to be No First Use - not firing until the other side has decided to fire.)

 The next major impact on Soviet thinking was the increasing effectiveness of precision guided munitions (PGMs), some of which may approach the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in mass destruction of military forces.  The 1980s saw an increasing concern over electronic warfare and information warfare as the spheres that impact on the effectiveness of PGMs.  In the 1990s this has expanded to a vision of the future battlefield as being non-linear, heavily intermixed, and characterized by intense struggles for information to control massed strikes by PGM and enhanced conventional munitions.

Further Reading for Part II:

Glantz
Erickson
CJ Dick
Schnieder
Menning (preWWI)
 

Part III:  Soviet Tactics

1) General Principles
 The key principles of tactics the Soviets have promulgated:

 - Aggressiveness: sometimes translated as 'activeness': All forces must seek to destroy the enemy by the means that are available.  The defense must not be a matter of passive hiding, but of seeking to lure or drive the enemy into kill zones.  The offensive is seen as the means of achieving victory; the defense is a means of containing the enemy and shaping the battlefield situation to enable a decisive counterattack.

 - Surprise: must be sought in all circumstances.  Swift, decisive action in bringing force to bear upon the enemy is considered to be a good means of attaining surprise - catching the enemy off guard and unprepared to react to the scale of the attack.  The Soviets do not expect to achieve ‘total surprise’ in any event; they expect instead to catch the enemy unaware as to some combination of the timing, nature, strength, or axis of the attack.  Any of these is considered a worthwhile goal of itself, because it will disorient the enemy defense.

 - Mass: meaning the timely concentration of decisive forces and weight of fire on an attack axis at the time of the attack.

 - Maneuver: of both forces and fire.  By the latter, the Soviets consider an artillery regiment shifting its target to be maneuvering its fire.  They are convinced that the maneuver of long-range fires in Recon-Strike Complexes (integrated systems permitting the Front- or Theatre-wide real-time or near-real-time engagement & destruction of targets) is one of the keys to future war.

 - Combined Arms: the Soviets have never fallen for one-weapon solutions (the Tank, the Strategic Bomber, the Nuclear Missile [though they came close to the latter for a bit]).  Tanks need infantry, which needs anti-tank weapons, for the suppression of which tanks need artillery, and so on.  Nuclear strikes require mechanized forces to attack through the disrupted zone or the strike may be useless.  All forces require engineering support to enable them to overcome obstacles rapidly.

 - Command and Control: must be maintained, with directives flowing down to keep the entire force fighting the same battle, and information on the situation flowing up.  In addition, this refers to the needs for fire support nets to function smoothly and continuously.

 - Depth.  One of the most recurrent themes in Soviet military writings is depth.  They have long recognized that tactical and operational defenses are not lines but areas; that the forward zone depends on the actions of the rearward zones for its effectiveness and vice versa.  Hence an oft-repeated recogniztion of the need to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the depths of his defense.  Additionally, they recognize that through increased depth on an attacking formation, through echeloning, fresh forces can be brought to bear more quickly at the point of decision, preventing the enemy from reacting as easily.  In the defense, a deeper defense has more time and opportunity to attrit, disrupt, dislocate, mislead and destroy the enemy.
 This also leads to the tendency of the Soviets to reinforce success.  They like that idea, but not as an axiom to be followed slavishly (on conversation with Soviet reserve officers in 1989-1990, they were uniformly unhappy with the supposed official solution in Suvorov/Rezun’s famed tactical problem in _Inside the Soviet Army_ - they preferred to reinforce the collapsing section of the front, not the group grinding forward slowly.)  However, as stated by Marshal Ogarkov, the most important thing in was is ‘to convey success into the depths’ – to exploit a breakthrough with maximum force.  This often produces a similar appearance to ‘reinforce success’, but is not, strictly speaking, the same.

2) Battle Drill & Initiative

 Probably the most enduring stereotype of the Soviet way of war is that of rigidity - attacks at all costs, orders followed slavishly, tactics by the exact diagram in the manual regardless of the situation.  This is also one of the stereotypes most likely to cause heartburn - or death - in an enemy facing a Soviet-style opponent executing the doctrine properly.

 Remember this:  A Soviet officer is expected to display initiative.  When executing a Battle Drill or a superior's order, the orders given must be altered as necessary to fit the specific situation and mission.  The drills are a route to speedy communication & execution in accordance with Patton's belief that "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week".

 Thus, the expectation of an officer runs in this manner:  A situation arises.  The officer arrives at a decision, with the help of those norms of conduct the officer belives to be applicable.  The order is given as one or more battle drills, each modified as far as necessary to meet the needs of the mission.  The Soviets would not consider an officer who did something stupid by following the letter of the book to have acted properly - they would consider the officer stupid.
 

3) March Formations

 The Soviets use two types of march formations:

 Not expecting contact with the Enemy ('administrative').

 Expecting Contact with the Enemy

 A march when not expecting contact is conducted when outside the range of the enemy's long-range weapon systems.  This may involve rail movement, or sea/air lift as well as individual vehicles moving.

 A march expecting contact is used when within range of enemy long-range weapons - including tactical strike aircraft and long-range artillery systems.  This will involve the deployment of security elements and a high state of alert for all units; the formation is used when speed is of the essence (often, in the Soviet view: see 'surprise') and the enemy threat is relatively light.

 A Division in March Formation:  (Keep in mind that the specific numbers would be subject to change depending on the situation.  There is no rigid template; there is an attitude about how it ought to be done; variations from the 'norm' are normal.)

 A division marches with recon patrols up to 100km forward of the main body; it advances on a frontage of up to 25 kilometers, containing 2 to 4 march routes.

 Several hours ahead of the main body is the Forward Detachment, tasked to seize critical points for the advance, find routes for the main body, and if necessary raid critical enemy installations.  A divisional Forward Detachment is usually of Regimental or Battalion size, either being taken from a second-echelon division or regiment.  The Forward Detachment is usually reinforced with anti-tank and bridging assets.

 The Main Body is itself echeloned in depth, with the lead regiment(s) in the first echelon and successive regiment(s) in the second.

 Each regiment in the division's first echelon has an avenue of up to 15 kiloemeters with 1 or 2 march routes.  First echelon regiment's recon may be up to 50 km ahead of the regiment.

 The regiment will deploy an Advance Guard 20 to 30 kilometers ahead, usually of a reinforced battalion.  It is intended to scout and clear the march route, screen against enemy recon, and provide the regiment with the warning necessary to deploy in the event of enemy contact.

 The Advance Guard, in turn, sends out a Forward Security Element (FSE) 5 to 10 kilometers ahead of itself to perform march security for the Advanced Guard.  The FSE sends a Forward Patrol of squad or platoon size 3-5 km forward as its own forward recon.

 The first echelon regiments may also deploy a Forward Detachment ahead of the Advance Guard; the Forward Detachment would usually be a reinforced second-echelon battalion, or a company from a second echelon-battalion.  In addition, all regiments, of all echelons, deploy flank security elements usually of company or smaller size, and Rear Security Elements, usually of company size or smaller.

 Looking at the divisional march formation, the emphasis on echeloning and recon is striking.  The Soviets want to be able to find the enemy first, and ensure that they have the time to react after contact is made.  Fix-and-flank is very much a favored concept; thus the FSE may fix an enemy force for the Advance Guard, which in turn creates conditions for the comittment of the leading echelon of the Main Body of the Regiment, and then the second echelon of the Division - in theory, a cascade of growing power against the obstacle presented by the enemy.
 

 When contact with the enemy is expected to be imminent, forces from Regiment downwards shift into Pre-Battle Formation.  Again, remember that the distances mentioned are by no means set in stone; the Soviet commander is expected to adapt to the situation.  The concept is key, not the distances.

 Pre-Battle Formation means somewhat different thing to units at different levels, but in general the point is this:  the force deploys from a single column march formation into several smaller march columns.  The force should be well drilled in doing this, especially at the lower levels, in order to enable the force to shift between battle, pre-battle, and march formations rapidly, enabling it to cope rapidly with changing circumstances.

 A regiment shifts into Pre-Battle Formations, typically, at 12-15 kilometers from the enemy's forward positions; battalions shift at 4 to 6 kilometers, and companies at 1 to 4 kilometers.  If the nature of the terrain or mission dictate some other distance to be better it will be used.

 A force of given size is considered to have shifted into Battle Formation if its subordinates 2 levels down are in Pre-Battle Formation.  A Company deploys into Battle Formation 800 to 1000 meters from the enemy's forward positions.  If there are mechanized infantry they will rarely be dismounted farther from the enemy line than 1000 meters, nor closer than 400.  The IFVs follow behind and/or to the side, providing fire support.

4) Meeting Engagement

 When the regiment runs into an enemy also on the march, the likely result is a meeting engagement - where both sides are attempting to achieve a mission via offensive action.  The Soviets consider this to be one of the most likely forms of combat in modern warfare.  Given the lack of a continuous front line, there is great scope for maneuver and need for flank and rear security.  The Soviets try to cultivate junior officer's initiative as one of the key factors in a battle of this nature, coping with the need for rapid, bold, decision-making in the face of very uncertain situations.  As with the actions described of the security elements of a march column, the key tactical concept here is fix and flank through rapid offensive action.

5) Attack

 The meeting engagement may fail to achieve its objectives, however, leaving the two sides staring at each other.  In an attack against a defending enemy, the Soviets prefer to attack from out of contact, often by passing the attacking force through the front-line force.  By doing this they hope to secure a greater degree of surprise.

 A division is expected to select an axis for a breakthrough.  The breakthrough sector extends in depth through the rear of the defending enemy battalions.  For the attack on this point, the Soviets expect to concentrate almost all divisional fire assets, and expect a major commitment of Army and Front (Army Group) fire support as well.  The lead forces carry an initial mission of destroying the enemy force of one size smaller than themselves.  Subsequent missions for companies are assisting in the destruction of enemy comapies; for battlions is the securing of the enemy battalion rear; for regiments is the destruction of the enemy brigade reserve; for division, the securing of the enemy brigade rear.  The follow-on mission for the division will be to destroy enemy division reserves.

 The second echelon of the division is used for deeper missions, with the expectation that the first echelon will be too badly beaten up, or too badly disorganized, to maintian the tempo of the assault - better to commit fresh forces.  Likewise, the exploitation is likely to be conducted by the Army second echelon divisions, or by an Operational Maneuver Group of several divisions with extensive fire and logistic support, intended to drive deep into the enemy rear, disrupting and dislocating his operational defense.

 Looking back at the point of attack, the Soviets believe strongly in throwing a lot of firepower quickly at the enemy in the sector under attack, both to kill defenders and to suppress them for the time necessary to get their troops across No Man's Land.  This emphasis on massive firepower quickly delivered explains their long and ongoing love for multiple rocket launchers.

 After a successful breakthrough, the forces moving into the depth conduct a pursuit.  These forces will move in pre-battle formation for speed, switching as necessary into battle formation for an attack.  The pursuit is intended to prevent the enemy from conducting an organized withdrawal.  As a result, the Soviets place emphasis on the Parallel Pursuit, where forces attempt to outrace retreating enemy formations, head them off, and destroy them, preferably with fire assets.  Airmobile forces are considered useful for siezing key peices of blocking terrain to prevent enemy withdrawals and/or ensure rapid friendly advance.

6) Defense

 The defense is seen as a useful, albeit not of itself decisive, form of combat.  Regardless of its type, the mission of the defense is to delay and attrit the enemy to the point that a counterattack is possible.  If possible, the counterattack should be turned into a counteroffensive.  The Soviets consider Kursk to be a model defensive operation.

 Hasty defenses are conducted during mobile engagements or during an attack to meet an enemy counterattackhold key terrain, or secure an open flank.

 The Soviets distinguish between two types of defense: in and out of contact with the enemy.  Defense out of direct contact is distinctly preferred, and a force defending in direct contact will split off a second echelon to prepare a deeper defense, then usually withdraw the elements in contact to the out-of-contact line once it is prepared.

 Defense in direct contact is usually the result of an unsucsessful attack.  The unit’s lead elements assume a linear defence on the best available ground in their avenue of advance, while the main body regroups to form a main line of defence further to the rear.

 A defense out of contact is a rather more elaborate affair, involving a series of zones; a given division can routinely expect to have had significant engineering, maneuver, and artillery assets transferred to it from higher commands (Army and Front).

 The most forward of these, the security zone, could be up to 20 kilometers deep for a division.  The division will usually place a reinforced motorized rifle battalion in the zone.  This battalion will fight from a series of prepared platoon positions, each offering suppressive fires for cover of the withdrawal of elements from the previous defensive line.  The final of these defensive lines is called the Forward Position; its shape corresponds to, although it is forward of, the forward edge of the division’s defence.  If possible, the enemy attack is to be defeated at the Forward Position, the enemy attack having already been attritted through the attacks on succesive positions.

 The Main Defensive Zone begins at the Forward Edge of the defence.  A division typically uses two echelons, with 2 motorized rifle regiments in the first echelon and a motorized rifle regiment plus a tank regiment in the second.  The first echelon’s mission is to slow down, break up, and if possible defeat the enemy attack in the forward edge of the defence.  The second echelon will conduct counterattacks to restore the line and/or gain new and better positions, destroy enemy airmobile attacks, or reinforce the first echelon.

 The tactical defense concentrates on the creation of an interlocking series of strong points, obstacles, and fire sacks, all designed to draw the enemy into preregistered kill zones.  Reverse slope defenses are preferred, and dummy positions are encouraged.  Alternate positions are built and all commanders are expected to withdraw to them if the situation demands it, possibly using covering fire from their unit’s second echelon forces (usually tank forces, as they are also to be the counterattack force).

 If the enemy is halted, the enemy should be counterattacked in order to complete the defensive victory and eject the attackers from any ground gained.  If practicable this will be expanded into gaining useful ground beyond the initial line of defence.
 
 The keys to defensive battle are seen as:

Maneuver of fire and forces throughtout the width and depth of the security zone and the main defensive zone

Wide dispersal within battle formations along the front an in depth

Absence of a continuous front

Surprise, ambush, and espesially anti-tank ambush

Non-uniform development of defensive operations along the front and depth of the defense

‘Activeness’ – the need for all forces to seek to actively destroy the enemy: Ferocity, intensity, and aggressiveess
 

Special Units:

The Forward Detachment

 This force is, quite literally, the spearhead of the offensive.  After forming a breach in the enemy main line of defence, divisions, armies, and Fronts will introduce second echelon forces into the breach to exploit the breakthrough into the enemy’s operational depths.  Those exploitation forces will be lead by Forward Detachments.

 A Forward Detachment’s mission is to find a fovorable route for the friendly forces following it; to seize key pieces of terrain; and to defeat approaching enemy reserves to prevent their interfering with the advance.  It is expected to operate in questionable contact with its own headquarters and thus must be commanded with independence and initiative.

 A Forward Detachment’s size is usually an element two levels down from the HQ commanding it.  Thus a Regimental FD is built on the basis of a company, a Divisional FD on a Battalion basis, and Front FD on a Regiment.  These units are then heavily reinforced by the parent organization, both with extra maneuver elements to ensure solid combat power, extra anti-tank punch, and a combined-arms structure, extra recon forces, engineering assets, both to ensure mobility (road repair, bridge construction, mine-clearing), and Mobile Obstacle Detachments (see below), and with artillery assets since the FD is expected to operate beyond the range of friendly artillery fire.

 In structure, the FD assumes the normal movement to contact formation, with recon in the lead, followed by a Forward Security Element (FSE) – which acts as a mini-FD for the FD – followed by an Advance Guard, a Main body, and a Rear Guard.  It is expected to move fast, hit hard enough to overwhelm many opponents, and avoid those it cannot, fufilling the mission Marshal Ogarkov called the single most important thing in war: "carrying success into the depths".
 

 The Anti-Tank Reserve

 The anti-tank reserve is usually drawn from some combination of manpack ATGMs, BRDM-AT launcher vehicles, MT-12 100mm AT guns, and 2A45M 125mm AT guns – usually in a mix of guns and missiles, with the guns expected to make up for the missile’s weaknesses in rate of fire and close-range punch (especially if the chemical energy warheads cannot penetrate the enemy armor), while the ATGMs provide long-range precision fires.

 In a defence, AT reserves are employed as a first-echelon formations’ reserve, moved to spots in need of extra anti-tank firepower.  Often several possible commitment sites are prepared and planned in advance for more rapid deployment.

 In an advance, the ATGMs may be used during the artillery preparation for destroying fixed targets.  During the actual advance, its role is that of screening open flanks and defending against enemy counterattacks.  Anti-Tank Reserve will often be well forward in the march column to provide ready, heavy, anti-tank firepower for the advancing column.

 The Mobile Obstacle Detachment and Minefields

 This is a temporary grouping of engineering subunits intended to create minefields and demolitions.  It often works in concert with the Anti-Tank Reserve to create ambushes.

 The Soviets tend to prefer minefields that are short and deep over ones that are thin and wide as they believe the former have better stopping power and tend to channel the attacker better.

 As they believe the element of surprise is key to the use of mines, they also emphasize the notion of laying them at the last minute – preferably after the attack is already underway, giving the enemy the most minimal possible time to detect the field and avoid it, and also creating the maximum amount of disrutpion in the enemy’s attack plan.  Such hasty minefields could be laid by vehicle, helicopter, or artillery.  (This does not in any way preclude the use of minefields laid well in advance as well.)

 The Mobile Obstacle Detachment functions as one of the commander’s tactical reserves, usually with one or more pre-planned lines of commitment.  In the defence it usually is in the first echelon’s immediate reserve, to block lines of breakthorugh, or in the front to block lines of imminent attack.  In the offensive, it assists in defending open flanks or repelling enemy counterattacks.

 Engineers

 This section is little more than a footnote on an area in which the Soviets invested a great deal of time and effort.  Recognizing the importance of mobility to an offensive they attached a great deal of engineering assets to their formations, providing a wealth of mining, mineclearing, entrenching, and bridging equipments.  These were to be assigned to forward forces to assit them in moving forward rapidly or in warding off enemy counterattacks.

 Air Desant Forces

 (See below for TOE information.)

 These forces provide the vertical envelopment capability; the soviets have been increasingly interested in this aspect of warfare.  Typically, the airmobile forces would be used for one of several tasks:

To seize and hold key pieces of terrain through which attacking forces expect to exploit

To raid and destroy key enemy installations or rear-area forces – such as operational or strategic HQs, nuclear delivery systems, key logistics organizational points

To act as a mobile reserve to counter enemy penetrations, either by dropping into key positions on trheir path of attack or by dropping into their rear to disruption their combat support, and cut them off for destruction

The typical mode of employment for these forces is to drop them in – by paradrop or helicopter – 2-10 kilometers from the objective.  This is intended to enhance the security of the drop.  The troops then advance by various routes to the objective and conduct a coordinated assault, often on several axes.  However, if the assault is heliborne, surprise is paramount, and the enemy defenses are expected to be light enough for a direct assault to be practical, then a direct assault, with gunships providing cover fire for a landing directly onto the target, may be used.

 Helicopter formations tend to resemble ground formations, with a main body of the transports (or simply the main force of strike helicopters) escorted by outlying groups of helicopters in the flank security and forward recon roles.
 

The 1990’s: Soviet Views on the Future of Warfare

---

TOEs:  MRDiv, Tank Div, MR Regiment, Tank Regiment,
 Keep in mind that any of the units here could reasonably expect a significant degree of support from higher formation – so a Division might easily have far more maneuver or support elements than listed, due to attachments from Army or Front.